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MEDIATING FACTORS FOR 
PERSONNEL CHANGES 
UNDER GORBACHEV 
Shugo Minagawa 
This paper is designed first to identify the extent of personnel 
changes under Gorbachev， particularly focusing on the top and middle 
levels of party and government officialdom for the last two and half 
years. A careful study of the changing membership of bodies such as 
the Politburo， Central Committee Departments and Secretariat， the 
Presidium and members of the federal Council of Ministers， and first 
secretaries of regional party committees may reveal certain trends 
and characteristics in their composition， which in turn may suggest 
changing leadership perceptions of the kind of personnel required by 
these bodies. However， these characteristics of personnel changes te1l 
us only partia1ly about the political realities of personnel decisions， 
and these characteristics do not necessarily affect dir巴ctlythe actual 
policies and political system of the Soviet Union. 1 wil1 therefore 
explore in the second half of this paper what one might ca1l the 
mediating factors between the cadres policy and Gorbachev's authority 
building programmes. 
1. The Brezhnev Regime and its Personnel Policy 
The Brezhnev regime created initially a situation in which leaders 
could mutual1y guard against an excessive expansion of any one man's 
inf1uence.1) This type of oligarchic rule promoted consensual leadership 
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as we11 as limited political flexibility. One of its drawbacks was that 
excessive time was spent in arriving at policy decisions， th巴efficiency
of the executive machinery decreased， government policies became a 
mere product of compromise， and immediate action to a11eviate the 
country's severe economic conditions was obstructed. This pattern of 
rule by compromise also weakened the effectiveness of the party's 
control mechanism at a1 levels and， as a result， raised the political 
status of functional units such as the Foregn Ministry， the State 
Planning Committee and particularly the military， the police and 
inte11igence bureaux.2) The seemingly anomalous emergence after 
Brezhnev of Andropov and Chernenko who had no large independent 
power base in the party machine and thus no widespread network of 
personnel connections， has been largely attributed to the pattern of 
collective leadership bequeathed by the Brezhnev regime. Another 
characteristic feature of the Brezhnev regime was the way in which 
the vacant positions of， inparticular， the middle leadership were filed. 
If the first secretary of a regional party committee resigned， they 
tried to get a recruit from that region. In the case of a member 
of the Council of Ministers， they preferred to promote an official 
of the same ministry /agency as the incumbent. While the policy of 
“stability of personnel" ensured organizational stability and continuity， 
this caused blockage of constant influx of fresh and talented personnel 
into the middle leadership. 
n. Personnel Affairs during the Andropov Era 
Brezhnev's successor， Yuri Andropov criticised superficial reform 
plans and took a pragmatic policy stance. He also initiated substantial 
personnel changes. In view of the political context of his selection as 
general secretary， from the military and the security was predicted 
initially for most of the replacements in top leadership positions， but 
on the contrary， it was mostly middle-ranking party officials and 
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Gosρlan officials who were appointed.3) A few outstanding examples 
of these appointments are: Egor Ligachev， first secretary of Tomsk 
obkom， to head of the Party Organization Work Department of the 
Central Committee and secretary of the Central Committee; Nikolai 
Ryzhkov， first deputy chairman of Gosplan， to be Central Committee 
secretary and head of its Economic Department; Vitalii Vorotnikov， 
first secretary of Krasnodar kraikom， to chairman of the RSFSR 
Council of Ministers; Nikolal Slyn'kov， deputy chairman of Gostlan， 
to first secretary of the Belorussian central committee; and Lev 
Zaikov， chairman of the Leningrad city soviet executive committee， to 
first secretary of Leningrad obkom. It is of great interest that the 
first four persons had been c10se (perhaps， Ligachev and Vorotnikov 
were less c1ose) to Andrei Kiri1enko who had once contended with 
Konstantin Chernenko for succession， but fel into obscurity after 
Brezhnev's death. Andropov himself is thought to have been linked 
with the recently deceased Mikhai1 Suslov but， because of the shallow 
structure of his c1ientelist connections， he might have sought to coopt 
the “orphaned" members of the Kiri1enko and “Sverdlovsk -Gosplan" 
faction as a counterweight to the sti1 powerful Chrnenko. However， 
in al likefood， he was inclined to stress the individual's abilities over 
other criteria in his decisions on personnel affairs. Andropov and 
Kirilenko had been acquainted wi th each other since the mid-1930s 
when they served as Komsomol secretaries in an educational institution 
in Rybinsk city (now Andropov city)， Yaroslavl region (oblast). 
Although they came to have different personnel connections thereafter， 
both of them continued to insist upon a strong economic growth 
policy and appeared to understand each other's political views.4) 
Personnel reshuffling was of course carried out by the succeeding 
Chernenko regime， though different in scope and inf1uence. The point 
of Chernenko's personnel policy lies not in the number of personnel 
changed but in the content of those changes. For example， 9 percent 
(14 in number) of the first secretaries of regional party committees 
in the USSR were replaced during Chernenko's tenure of office， 
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whereas 22 percent (32 in number) had been replaced during Andropov's 
and only one of those 14 first secretaries was a ful member of the 
Central Committee against 9 of 32 under Andropov. This shows that， 
unlike the conservative Chernenko， Andropov had been aware of the 
need to break up the fossillized framework of leadership in order to 
push forward with economic reform. Although a substantial number 
of senior officials were changed during the Andropov period， some 
changes seem to have been aimed primarily at effecting compromise 
with other leaders. Consequently， he did not succeed in his short rule 
in changing the leadership enough to carry out a large-scale reform 
of the nation's economic and political structure. As a result， such an 
attempt had to be deferred til the current Gorbachev administration. 
Gorbachev's choice of persons for the top leadership positions listed 
in Table 1 looks as if it were an extension of Andropov's personnel 
policy. 1n other words， the personnel reshuffling under the Gorbachev 
regime seems to have been initiated by Andropov. 
m. Trend of Personnel Affairs under the 
Gorbachev Leadership 
During the one-year period between the time Gorbachev became 
General Secretary of the Central Committee in March 1985 and the 
27th Congress held in March 1986， changes of top level officials took 
place on four occasions. 1n order to see the process of consolidation 
of power， itwould be best to examine these four stages sequentially. 
At the April 23 1985 plenary session of the Central Committee 
held shortly after he took over the post of General Secretary， Gorba-
chev promoted Central Committee secretaries Ligachev and Ryzhkov， 
and KGB chairman Viktor， M. Chebrikov， who are al regarded as 
sympathizers with Gorbachev's authority building strategy， to be 
Politburo members. By the appointments of Ligachev and Ryzhkov 
(though they are less disciplinarians) as well as the entry of the KGB 
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chairman， the continuance of Andropov's course directed to streng-
thening public order and tightening control over corruption became 
at this stage more visible than ever. There was also a politically 
prudent aspect to this first batch of personnel changes， for Defense 
Minister Sergei L. Sokolov's promotion to candidate Politburo member 
at the plenary session was evidently intended to gain the favour of 
the mi1itary， although the latter may have expected his promotion to 
ful Politburo member. 
Following the changes in April， the post of chairman of the USSR 
Supreme Soviet Presidium， which had remained vacant since the death 
of Konstantin Chernenko， was given to Andrei Gromyko， first deputy 
chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign 
Affairs， at the Central Committee plenary session and USSR Supreme 
Soviet session on July 1-2， 1985. Gromyko was accordingly released 
from the first deputy chairmanship and the foreign ministry， and 
Eduard Shevardnadze， who until then was candidate Politburo member 
and first secretary of the Georgian republic party committee， took 
his place as Foreign Minister and was promoted to Politburo member. 
As a result， the quasi-conventional concurrent occupation of Supreme 
Soviet Presidium chairmanship and general secretaryship came to an 
end and the“troika" system was revived， where the three major posts 
of the Soviet Union were shared by three individuals， Brezhnev 
prot岳geNikolai Tikhonov stil remaining chairman of the Council of 
Ministers. The revival of the troika also put an end to the unusual 
situation of a Foreign Minister being simultaneously first deputy 
chairman of the Council of Ministers (although the same thing had 
occurred during the war period). The Presidium of the Council of 
Ministers inherently functions as a sort of “standing committee" of 
the Politburo in fields of national economy， education and social 
welfare. Although the Foreign Ministry， Defense Ministry， KGB， etc. 
are represented in the Council of Ministers， these three organizations 
were usually excluded from the Presidium of the Council of Ministers.6) 
The appointment of Shevardnadze as Foreign Minister， i.e. of a man 
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with experience in local politics but little in foreign affairs， isgene-
rally seen as aimed primarily at establishing an environment in which 
the general secretary himself could conduct foreign policies. At the 
same plenary session of the Central Committee， secretary Grigory V. 
Romanov， who had been seen as a rival of Gorvachev for the general 
secretaryship， was forced to retire from both the Politburo and the 
Secretariat， thus removing a potential centre of opposition. 
The next series of personnel changes came into effect in September 
through December; on September 27， 1985， Politburo member and 
secretary Ryzhkov took the place of Tikhonov as chairman of the 
Council of Ministers. Then， on October 14， Baibakov who had been 
serving as chirman of the Gosplan for many years was released and 
Talyzin， deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and Soviet 
permanent representative to the Council of Mutual Economic Assista-
nce， was appointed in his stead and concurrently as first deputy 
chairman of the Council of Ministers. Talyzin was further promoted 
to candidate Politburo member at a Central Committee plenary 
session. This concurrent appointment as candidate member， a position 
never enjoyed by Talyzin's predecessor， implies the rise of Gosρlan's 
status in the bureaucratic hierarchy. It also suggests the top leader's 
intention of investing new functions in Gosplan， making it responsible 
for the strategy， as well as the details， of econnmic planning.6l 
Following the appointment of Talyzin， four deputy chairmen were 
released from the Presidium of the Council of Ministers and five new 
ones were appointed-nam巴ly，Minister of Aviation Industry Silaev， 
GosPlan first deputy chairmen Voronin and Maslyukov， chairman of 
the State Committee on Labour and Social Questions Batalin， and 
former Stavropol' kraikom first secretary Murakhovsky who had once 
worked under Gorbachev， and was now put in charge of a reorganised 
agricultural administration. One should note that two of these were 
promoted from the GosPlan. 
The fourth series of changes took place in February and March 
1986， with a Party Congress included in the period. At the February 
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18 CPSU Central Committee plenary session， Viktor V. Grishin was 
removed from Politburo membership and his successor as Moskov city 
party committee first secretary， Boris N. Yel'tsin was named as 
candidate member. Rusakov， secretary in charge of relations with 
socialist countries was also released at the same session. Yel'tsin had 
been promoted very fast-he had become head of Construction Depa-
rtment of the Central Committee only in April 1985， leaving the post 
of first secretary of the party committee in Sverdlovsk oblast， the 
centre of the Urals industrial area， and advanced to Central Committee 
secretaryship in July， then to first secretaryship of the Moskov city 
party committee in December， about two months before his entry into 
the Politburo as a candidate. For some time between 1966~76， while 
Ryabov， former deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers， was in 
service as second secretary， then secretary of Sverdlovsk obkom 
Yel'tsin worked under Ryabov as obkom department head and then 
secretary. Because Ryabov himself served as first secretary of 
Sverdlovsk gorkom， while Kirilenko was first secretary of that region 
from 1955 to 1962， Yel'tsin is regarded as a loosely related member 
of Kirilenko group. At the Party Congress in March 1986， one new 
Politburo member (Zaikov)， two candidate members (Slyun'kov and 
Solov'ev)， and five secretaries (Yakovlev， Razumovsky， Dobrynin， 
Biryukova， and Medvedev) were appointed. Ponomarev and Kuznetsov 
were relieved as candidate members of the Politburo， and the former 
and Kapitonov as Central Committee secretaries. The first two were 
retired， whilst Kapitonov， who had long been in charge of personnel 
affairs for local party organizations， was given the post of chairman 
of the Audit Commission of the Central Committee. The five new 
secretaries are either persons with firsthand experience in production 
activities or experts in economy， foreign relations， science， etc. The 
appointment of Dobrynin， former Ambassador to the United States， 
as secretary with his rich experience in foreign affairs， appears to 
strengthen the foreign policy-making capability of the Secretariat. 
Central Committee Propaganda Department head Yakovlev's (who has 
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spent a1most his entire career in propaganda work) promotion to 
secretary 100ks as if it were designed to enhance the appea1 of Soviet 
proposa1s in the outside wor1d. Since he， though on1y a short time， 
was the director of the Wor1d Economy and Internationa1 Re1ations 
Research Institute (lMEMO)， he presumab1y p1ays the part of a 
mediator in communications with experts and policy ana1ysis groups. 
At the Kazakh Centra1 Committee p1enary sesssion he1d on Dece-
mber 16， 1986， it was decided to send its first secretary， Kunaev， 
into retirement.7) His rep1acement is Gennady Ko1bin， a 59-year-old 
Russian. It was unexpected (a1though the same thing had occurred in 
the 1950s) to see a native Kazakh rep1aced by an ethnic Russian. 
Ko1bin had he1d party posts in the Vo1ga basin and in the southern 
republic of Georgia. He has been prominent in Gorbachev's drive to 
stamp out alcoholism， 1aziness and corruption. 
In the second year of the Gorbachev regime， very modest personne1 
changes appeared to be recorded in major party organs (see Tab1e 11). 
At the 10ng-de1ayed Centra1 Committee p1enum he1d on January 28， 
1987 however Kunaev 10st his Politburo seat finally， a1though Shcher-
bitsky， the other important ally of Brezhnev， remained in p1ace as 
Ukrainian party boss and on the Po1itburo.8) It may be interesting to 
note that， since Gorbachev came to power (til1 March 1987)， 10 out of 
19 obkom first secretaries in Kazakhstan have been removed， whereas 
in Ukraine on1y 3 out of 25 obkom first secretaries have been rep1a-
ced. Kunaev's successor Ko1bin fai1ed however to be admitted to 
Politburo as candidate. At the same p1enum， A1exander Yakov1ev， who 
is regarded as a Gorbachev ally and who is a Centra1 Committee 
secretary in charge of the Propaganda Department， was promoted to 
candidate membership of the Po1itburo. The Centra1 Committee a1so 
e1ected two new secretaries. They are Ryzhkov's prot邑g邑 Niko1ai
Slyun'kov (first secretary Be10russian party) and Gorbachev's prot邑g己
Anato1y Lukyanov (head， Genera1 Affairs Department， CC). Mikhai1 
Zimyanin， a Centra1 Committee secretary who was in charge of 
ideo10gy， was retired on hea1th grounds. In the following month 
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(February 1987)， four new members of the Council of Ministers were 
appointed. Of these， three positions (Chairmen of Goskomnefteρrodukt 
and State Committee for Science and Technology， and Minister of 
Health) had been left vacant for some time. Chairman of People's 
Control Committee， A. M. Shkol'nikov was retired on pension and 
replaced by S. 1. Manyakin (1st secretary， Omsk obkom). As Slyun'kov 
had been promoted to the Central Committee Secretariat， E. E. 
Sokolov (1st secretary， Brest obkom) was appointed as Slyun'kov's 
successor in Belorussia. Slyn'kovalso took over， as expected， Ryzhkov's 
former responsibi1ities in the Secretariat for oversight of the economy. 
First deputy chief of the Agriculture and Food Industry Department 
of the Central Committee， 1. 1. Skiba was appointed to head its 
department， as its former head， V. A. Karlov believed to be retired 
on pension. In the second year of the Gorbachev regime， despite the 
presence of a few senior members of the Brezhnev era in the Polit‘ 
buro， Gorbachev and Ryzhkov appear to have had a fairly free hand 
in changing top government leaders. One first deputy chairman 
(Arkhipov) and two deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers 
(Ryabov and Marchuk) were relieved in the second half of 1986. As 
replacements， first secretary of CheJyabinsk obkom (Vedernikov)， 
first deputy chairman of RSFSR Council of Ministers (Gusev)， Minister 
of Fisheries (Kamentsev)， then deputy chairman of State Committee 
for Science and TechnoJogy (ToJstykh) were appointed as deputy 
chairmen of the CounciJ of Ministers. 
The sixth series of changes took place in the mid-third year of 
the Gorbachev regime. In May 30， 1987， Sergei Sokolov was forced to 
retire as Defence Minister and repJaced by Dmitrii Yazov， 63， a 
relatively junior member of the military leadership. At the same 
time， Alexander KoJdunov， the Air Defence Commander-in-Chief， was 
dismissed. The unexpected plane episode-Ianding of a West German 
Iight aircraftin Red Square unimpeded by the Soviet air defences in May 
1987-gave Gorbachev an opportunity to f1ex his politicaI muscIes and 
consolidate control over the military. At the CentraI Committee 
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plenum held in July 26， 1987， Alexander Yakovlev (who was only 
admitted to the Politburo as candidate five months ago) ， Nikolai 
Slyun'kov (now a Central Committee secretary in charge of the 
economy)， and Viktor Nikonov (a Central Committee secretary in 
charge of the agriculture) are promoted to ful Politburo membership. 
At the same plenum， Sergei Sokolov was removed from Politburo 
candidate membership， and his successor Dmitrii Yazov was named 
as candidate Politburo member. 
This fifth and sixth batch of personnel changes， which were the 
first in the inner ranks of the Soviet leadership since the 27th Party 
Congress， left the Politburo with 14 ful members and six non-voting 
members. The Central Committee Secretariat now has 12 members 
associated with the Brezhnev era， notably Gromyko and Shcherbitsky， 
stil1 remain in the party's ruling body， Gorbachev has succeeded 
further in consolidating his political position in the Central Committee 
plenum by elevating his c10se personal supporters， such as Yakovlev， 
Nikonov and Lukyanov. Yakovlev may be regarded as one of Gorba-
chev's new friends. He appears to be increasingly active as a key 
adviser in the fields of not only propaganda but also ideology and 
international politics. Slyun'kov's elevation however helps consolidate 
Ryzhkov's position rather than Gorbachev's. 
lV. Characteristic Features of Personnel Changes 
(1) Top leadership 
With respect to the number of members in the Politburo which is 
of course the de facto top d巴cision-makingbody， the Secretariat is 
now better represented than the Presidium of the Council of Ministers 
in this body. It is worth observing here that， because there are 
overlapping functions and interlocking spheres of operation between 
the party and government machines， the amount of information flowing 
to the Politburo decreases and its effective dominance is impaired， if
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only one of these bodies (Secretariat and Government Presidium) is 
adequately represented in the Politburo.9) 
The ful members of the Politburo as of July 1987， were aged 63 
on the average， six years younger than the record of 69 at the 26th 
Party Congress of six years before. This difference is also reflected 
in the incumbents' tenure of ful Politburo membership， which averages 
4. 4 years， or merely 2. 4 years if the forementioned two senior 
members -Gromyko and Shcherbi tsky -of the Brezhnev group are 
excluded. Although their experience on the federal (central) level is 
limited， most have been party members for 30 years or more， denoting 
their long professional background at lower echelons. Control by a 
gerontocracy has certainly subsided， and since most Politburo members 
are unfamiliar with the Brezhnev's d巴cisionmaking style， itcan be 
expected that a quite new Politburo management style will emerge 
under Gorbachev's leadership. Generally speaking， candidate members 
have more executive experience at federal level and less as regional 
and republic cadres. They can be divided into two categories: those 
for whom the candidacy becomes a stage on the way to ful membership 
and those who remain (permanent) candidates by virtue of the value 
of their special knowledge and experience. The former head of the 
International Department of the Central Committee， Ponomarev， who 
retired recently， and former Minister of Culture， Demichev， who stil 
serves as candidate member， are examples of the latter category. As 
far as professional careers are concerned， ful and candidate members 
differ in inter-organizational circulation of career， for while about 80 
percent of ful members have held executive positions in the party-
state bureaucracy， just over 40 percent have such experience among 
candidate members in July 1987. Meanwhile， about 60 percent of the 
ful members have both specialist careers and executive experience 
against more than 80 percent of the candidates (see Table 4). 
In their ethnic breakdown， the Secretariat members are nearly al 
Russians whereas the Presidium of the Council of Ministers includes 
Ukrainians and natives of other republics， as shown in Table 5. All 
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members of both organizations have received higher education but it 
is obvious that expertise in industrial field is more strongly needed 
for Presidium members than for secretaries. Although the Presidium 
used to have many individuals with higher degrees， there are only a 
few among the present membership. Moreover， there is only a few in 
both the Secretariat and the Presidium who have received higher party 
education. To reeducate those cadres with weak educational background 
was the purpose of higher party education in the past but this need 
may have diminished in recent years. Both organizations are younger 
now， with an average age of about 60 years; the Presidium in parti-
cular， where more than 65 percent of the members are 60 years and 
under， has come to have a relatively high life expectancy (see Table 
6). Renewal is reflected in their previous careers; Presidium members' 
tenure in office is about one third of the average length of two years 
before (see Table 7)， and their length of experience in other positions 
has reduced proportionally. Turning to the career background of the 
Secretariat and Presidium members， about 50 percent of the Secreta-
riat members have experience in both party and state organizations， 
though the rate is somewhat on the decline. In 1984， most of the 
members of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers lacked overall 
executive experience in party organizations. However， since Gorbachev 
came into power， this has changed with the cooptation of five party 
officials. The rich professional experience of the Secretariat members 
is reflected in their inter-role circulation of careers (see Table 7). 
Although many of the previous Presidium members had started their 
careers with specialist occupations， the rate of those who have climbed 
up through less skilled occupations increased to something around 50 
percent in July 1987 from a little more than 6 percent three years ago. 
Since March 1985， the number of the Central Committee Departments 
decreased from 23 to 20. 18 out of 20 Department heads have been 
replaced in the last two and half years (see Table 11). The average 
age is now lowered from 70 to 62 years old. 
Since a minority only of both organizations have Politburo me-
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mbership， it is necessary to study the structure of each organization 
separately from the Politburo. It is the Politburo that makes the 
decision on matters of primary importance. However， itis the 
Secretariat and Presidium where conflicting interests are largely 
aggregated and articulated. 
(2) Middle leadership 
Ranking just below the top leadership are， as regards the party 
bureaucracy the first secretaries of regional party committees， and 
as regards the state bureaucracy the members ofthe USSR Council of 
Ministers. (The analysis of members of the Council of Ministers in 
this paper does not include Premiers of Union Republics， who are ex 
officio members of the federal Council of Ministers but appear to 
play no direct part in the work of central government.) The total 
number of first secretaries in al regions in the Soviet Union is 157. 
They are not al equal in political status， and therefore only the 
regions which come directly under the CPSU Central Committee (72 
in number consisting of krais， oblasts and autonomous republics in 
the RSFSR and Moskow city) are covered in this study. The other 
regions-i. e.， autonomous oblasts within the RSFSR and other repu-
blics，and oblasts in the republics other than the RSFSR-are lower in 
political status， and party officials in these regions (except the first 
secretaries of the Ukraine and Belorussian republics party committees) 
are hardly ever promoted to the central executive bodies of party 
and government directly. 
Of the 72 noted， changes of first secretary since Gorbachev came 
into power have been observed in 36 regions. Details on these changes 
are given below. 
Replacements in the past 28 months resulted in a 50 percent 
turnover rate (see Table ll)-a great pro rata increase over the 75 
percent replacement during the 15 years between 1964 and 1979.10) 
The rate of replacement as well as the method of recruitment looks 
at first sight as if policy had turned away local recruitment of first 
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secretaries， but the issue is rather complicated. First， a rotation of 
personnel exists between the central officialdom and regional party 
committees. For example， 13 inspectors of the Central Committee 
were transferred to be first secretaries of regional party committees. 
Al1 these 13 officials， however， have experience of party secretaryship 
at the regional level. They are probably middle-level party cadres 
who have been tested on their abilities， re-trained， discouraged from 
putting local interests above the “public" interest in the Central 
Committee， and sent back to practical work. Their tenure of office 
as inspector is general1y brief (ranging from two months to eighteen 
months). This is not a new practice but it has bocome， since the 
Andropov period， more and more common for such officials to be 
cal1ed to Moscow for training before receiving a higher post. Six of 
the inspectors had once served as lower cadres in the regions in 
which they now serve as first secretary (see Table 8-1). Twelve of 
the new regional first secretaries recruited from other source than 
inspectors were also coopted either directly or indirectly from the 
regions to which they used to belong (see Table 8-2). This means that 
50 percent of the 36 new appointees made their careers in the region 
they now head， whereas under Brezhnev period such appointments 
were close to 70 percent.H) This represents a return to the pre -1965 
pattern.12) All those romeved from the first secretaryship of regional 
party committees have been either pensioned off or appointed to 
higher posts in Moscow， except two who were transferred to the 
corresponding post in another region. Thus， the present top leadership 
is maintaining some degree of the policy of local recruitment and 
strengthening mutual relations between the central bodies and regional 
party committees by means of personnel exchanges. 
Let us turn now to the membership of the Council of Ministers. 
The expansion of government agencies remains an unavoidable pheno-
menon as long as a nation retains a centralized command economy. 
Table 10 indicates that in the last two years， quite a few state 
committees and ministries have been abolished， renamed， restructured 
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and established in line with the diversification and specialization of 
industrial sectors and improvement of industrial management.13l In the 
“developed socialist society" advocated by Soviet leaders， management 
in agriculture and industry is to be rationalized and， as has b巴en
mention巴dearlier concerning Gosρlan， there appears to be a gradual 
improvement in the supervision of industries by the central adminis-
trative bodies. For example， in November 1985， a Ministry of Medical 
and Biological Industry was established and the Ministry of Agricul-
tural Procurement was reorganized into a Ministry of Grain Products. 
A State Committee for Agro-Industry (Gosagroρrom) was also 
established. This Committee is based on the (former) Ministry of 
Agriculture， Ministry of Rural Construction， Ministry of Meat and 
Dairy Products Industry， Ministry of Food Industry， and the State 
Committee for Production and Technological Supply of Agriculture， 
aiming at improving the management of the agriculturaljindustrial 
complex.14l Its chairman V. S. Murakhovsky is concurrent1y first deputy 
chairman of the Council of Ministers. The leadership of Gosagroprom 
draws particularly on former middle-level party secretaries from 
agricultural regions.15l Agro-industrial associations which had been 
instituted on a wide scale in the Brezhnev period were run by several 
government agencies covering different administrative spheres and the 
irrationality of this management system had been pointed out for 
some time. Under such an organizational set-up， related agencies 
appeared to have pursured narrow departmental interests， and shifted 
responsibilities to each other. The creation of this type of“supermi-
nistry" is meant to preserve and streamline the central administration 
of economy. Here direct administrative controls down to enterprise 
level remain but are fewer， more broadly defined， and leave more 
scope for details to be determined at lower levels. The reformists 
like Tatyana Zaslavskaya and K. K. Val'tukh of Novosibirsk have con-
tinued to call for drastic cuts in the middle (i. e.， branch-ministry) 
levels of the economic hierarchy.16l The creation of the Bureau for 
Machine-Building， Commission for Improving Administration， Planning 
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and the Economic Mechanism Bureau for the Fuel Energy Complex， 
and Bureau for Social Development were announced in October 1985， 
in ]anuary 1986， in March 1986 and in November 1986 respectively.17) 
Although we knew the existence of the Mi1itary-Industry Commission， 
and Environmental Protection and the Rational Use of Natural 
Resources Commission attached to the Presidium of the Council of 
Ministers， litt1e has been published about these bodies. But they are 
not“superministries" in the sense that Gosagroprom is. These 
bureaux， that are chaired by deputy chairmen of the Council of 
Ministers， issue commands within their sphere of work (presumably to 
their branch ministries) that have the force of Council of Ministers 
instructions (rasρoryazheniya).18) The operations of these bureaux 
are probably similar to the Military-Industry Commission of the 
Presidium of the Council of Ministers， which coordinates the work of 
defense production branches. Thus， for instance， a Bureau for the 
Fuel and Energy Complex was formed to coordinate the work of those 
ministries and agencies that handle strategic fuel energy resources.19) 
In addition， part of the Law regulating the Council of Ministers was 
amended to formalise the establishment of a permanent bodies for 
operations between government economic agencies; the purpose was 
evidently the rationalization of executive branches of government.20) 
92 ministers were replaced in the period from 1966 to March 
1981，21) In the first year of the Gorbachev regime 33 appointments (i. 
e. in 36.3 percent of the total number of ministerial posts) were 
made (see Table 11). Of the new members of the Council of Ministers 
whose previous posts are known， about 45 percent of them were 
promoted from either the same agencies or functionally related 
agencies， although this rate was 70 percent or higher in the Brezhnev 
years.22) Howev巴r，in contrast with the share of a little over 60 percent 
represented by the transfers from state administrative organs， the 
entry of party officials (generalist as well as career specialist) into 
the Council of Ministers remains at around 20 percent. As for the 
members replaced， more have gone to state administrative organs 
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than to the party machinery， apart from those p1aced on a pension 
(see Tab1e 9). 
The individua1s new1y appointed as first secretaries of regiona1 
party committees and members of the Council of Ministers a1ready 
had high politica1 status at the time of appointment. In the case of 
the first secretaries， 28 out of 36 appointees were e1ected full members 
of the Centra1 Committee at the March 1986 Party Congress. Of 
the 63 new ministers， 26 were e1ected ful members and 14 became 
candidates. 
When the ethnic structure of these bodies is examined， Russians 
turn out to predominate in both， and this feature is more marked in 
the Counci1 of Ministers. Ukrainians account for about 10 percent in 
both the Council of Ministers and the RSFSR regional first secreta-
ries. Regional party committee first secretaries in the RSFSR include 
more ethnic minorities (other than the 15 republican nationalities) 
than the Council of Ministers. 
In respect of educational background， most of these middle ranking 
officials have passed through higher education， and there is a relatively 
large number of graduate degree holders-about 1. 5 in every 10 
persons. Those party officials who have finished the party's higher 
education courses are nearly three times as numerous as among 
government officials. Specialized knowledge in industry andjor agric-
ulture seems to be thought to be essential to first secretaries of 
regional party committees， since a little more than 40 percent of the 
incumbents have experience of industrial education with another 30 
percent experienced in agricultural education. The overwhelming 
majority of the Council of Ministers members have expert knowledge 
of industry and the specialities of others range from teaching， econo-
micsjfinance， technology， law， history， and medichine to military 
science. This reflects both the different responsibilities inherent in 
individual ministerial positions and the types of specialized knowledge 
required to fulfil the responsibi1ities. There has been however a 
marked trend as in the past in favour of party generalists in the 
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administration of security， culture and agriculture. Thus， during the 
last 28 months， Minister of Internal Affairs Fedorchuk was replaced 
by first secretary of the Rostov party obcom， Vlasov (in ]anuary 
1986); Minister of Culture Demichev by second secretary of the 
Moscow party gorkom， Zakharov (in April 1986). This follows the 
precedent that his two predecessors (Furtseva and Demichev) made 
their way， like Zakharov， in the local party machine in Moscow. 
Although the Ministry of Agriculture was abolished recently， its 
replacement， namely Gosagro prom is now headed by former first 
secretary of the Stavropol' obkom， Murakhovsky. T. H. Rigby's research 
on the membership of the Council of Ministers suggests that members 
of the Council of Ministers have traditionally been recruited from 
two main sources: officials who have risen to the top in a career 
devoted wholly or predominantly to the specialised branch of admini-
stration concerned and officials brought in from the party apparatus， 
usually from the post of regional first secretary， after a career 
devoted wholly or predominantly to“leading" work in the party. As 
might be expected the former tend to be chosen for more technical 
or professionalised bureaucracies and the latter for more political or 
“generalist" ones or those， like security， culture and agriculture where 
the local partyapparatus is heavily involved in operationalleadership.23) 
In this respect， Gorbachev's personnel policy has not departed from 
the past recruiting practice. 
Remarkable rejuvenation is noted in the middle echelons of both 
leadership structures. Their average age as of March 1987 is 59 years 
for the regional first secretaries， and 57 years old for the members 
of the Council of Ministers. Because many of their predecessors， who 
retired from these two middle leadership hierarchies to enter a 
pensioner's life， appear to be 65 years old or over， the cadres rejuve司
nation must have been accelerated， though this trend started in the 
Andropov era. This was particularly so in the case of the regional 
first secretaries. Their lowered average age of 59 was already reached 
in March 1984. The high turnover rate between March 1985 and 
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March 1987 must therefore be due to other reasons than that of 
rejuvenation.24) Personnel changes may be the first step in building 
up a regime' capable of implementing domestic and foreign policies 
designed to find its way out of the current situation. It is c1ear from 
the preceding analysis that personnel changes have been aimed at (1) 
rejuvenation of leaders， (2) preference of able technocrats， and (3) 
reinforcement of (central) party control. 
In principle， personal background， current position， and the current 
domestic and international environment are some of the factors 
determining the present political stance of a leader. The experiences 
characteristic of a generation can also be one of them. For example， 
one should bear in mind the case of Leonid Brezhnev， who assumed 
the key post of General Secretary at the relatively young age of 57 
years， but c10sed his 18 year reign without offering any deep-going 
reforms and indeed presided over the most conservative regime in 
Soviet history. The leaders in the Brezhnev era were characteristically 
born between 1900 and 1909 and did not experience the period of 
revolutionary ferment as party members. They were in their 30s or 
40s when the great purge (1937 ~ 1938) was carried out and， although 
perhaps not many of them took direct part in the dirty work during 
the purge， itgave them the opportunity of spectacular promotion. 
These leaders were mostly educated with technical training but poor 
in intellectual grounding， and their views were conventional， opportu-
nistic and short of creativity. Top leaders today (from Ligachev to 
Gorbachev) who are in their 50s to 60s hold not the “Outstrip the 
West" complex but， rather a consciousness of the USSR as a global 
power. They do not try to analyze the complicated internal and 
external situations through a dogmatic prism. They evaluate them 
realistically and attach relative importance to rationality when deci-
ding policies. Thus， good communication can be achieved between the 
leaders of the same generation who share a similar temperament and 
value judgements. However， as was disclosed at the Party Congress 
in March 1986， there is a difference in political standpoint between 
(75) 
215 
Ligachev (then 66) and Yel'tsin (then 55). While Yel'tsin criticized 
the irresponsibility of the party apparatus as well as the prevalence 
of sectionalism and corruption at the Congress.25) Ligachev warned 
against the tendency to excessive criticism， saying that derogatory 
material which had appeared in Pravda26) was likely to damage the 
prestige of the central party apparatus.27) Ligachev continued to be 
active as head of the Party Organization Work Department untill 
quite recently， and his statement may have come out of his responsi-
bilties as the second ranking official in the Secretariat， responsible 
for overseeing the entire party machinery. Thus， the leaders of the 
Gorbachev generation do not always act in unison over th巴 policy-
making process， since individual members even in the same generation 
do not always share the same mentality or values. 
It can be said that personnel replacements over the last two and 
half years centred on the formation of a practical management-oriented 
regime. In the case of the appointments of regional party committee 
first secretaries， an effort to improve the mechanism of vertical 
transfers seems to be in train in order to strengthen the connections 
between the central party apparatus and regional party committees. 
This arrangement might ease the problem of promotion bottleneck. 
Thus， party functionaries could be motivated for promotion， and at 
the same time the Soviet leaders might expect the nearly institutio-
nalized stable personnel transfers to increase the credibility of the 
regime. Gorbachev's personnel policy seems designed to re圃traincadres 
in practical work and to adapt the party machinery to the changing 
economic and social environment. In other words， the recent personnel 
changes at regional party level were made with both functional and 
political purposes. Similar purposes are also observable in ministerial 
replacements-i. e.， accelerating the horizontal transfers in the gove-
rnment machinery (though not always between similar organizations) 
to provide a feeling of stability among government officials， reducing 
the incumbent's tenure of office， and restraining the growth of 
sectionalism. 
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The next feature of the personnel policy of the Gorbachev regime 
is an intensification of the effort to maintain the integrity of the 
party-guided society by means of the“nomenklaturα" system， in 
which the party controls itself and other major organizations through 
personnel transfers. We have observed that the balance of represen-
tation in the Politburo has now shifted to the Secretariat and away 
from the Council of Ministers (see Table 1). We have also observed 
the inc1usion of a few Party generalists in the Presidium of the 
Council of Ministers. An increased mobility of inspectors is also 
indicative of party control by the centre. A reinforced capacity of 
the Central Committee Departments in policy process was also 
observed， particular1y in the case of its International Departments.28) 
A better example of centralization of party control is the fact that 
major republican first secretaries have now lost， except Ukraine， 
their seats in the Politburo (see Table 1)， although a few important 
nationalities other than Russian are represented indirectly (see Table 
2). A system， inwhich the party alone can validate the activities of 
other organizations has thus been consistently reinforced in the last 
two years through personnel replacement and institutional reorgani-
zation. 
v. Mediating Factor 
Since Gorbachev came into power， he has introduced a number of 
domestic policy changes. George Breslauer lists the following main 
domestic agenda items as being most indicative of Gorbachev's strategy 
for realizing his presumed goals.29) These are as follows: 
1. The anti-alcoholism campaign. 
2. The anti-corruption campaign. 
3. New incentives and rewards for the productive. 
4. Heavy investment in the machine-building sector. 
5. Moderate reform of economic structure. 
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6.‘Glasnost' campaign. 
7. Foreign relations-arms control and economic interdependence. 
8. Political democratization. 
Gustafson and Mann call this policy programme Gorbachev's 
authority building strategy.30) The question is what his domestic 
political goal is. Succeeding leaders since Lenin have al attempted 
and failed to eradicate the system's requirements of effectiveness and 
efficiency.31) Gorbachev is well aware of the fact that he has to 
introduce a reformist element into his policy agenda. Does this mean 
that Gorbachev has broken with the centralizing mobi1ization approach? 
On the contrary， even in his “epoch-making" speech at the Central 
Committee plenum on ]anuary 27， 1987， he reaffirmed one-party rule， 
the primacy of central planning， socialist ownership， and the Leninist 
principle of democratic centralism.32) It is clear from the domestic 
agendas listed above that these tasks are contradictory in themselves. 
My assumption is therefore that Gorbachev has adopted a mobilization 
approach like his predecessors， but one which is less centralized， less 
coercive， less orthodox and less dogmatic. 1n the process of achieving 
the highest possible mobilization of the system， he aims his domestic 
policy agendas eclectically at the political elite and the public at large 
as he sees fit. Thus， he does not concern himself very much with the 
contradictions in the domestic policy agendas.3) But he does concern 
himself with its timely and effective application of these policy 
agendas. 
We have observed above the extensive (in terms of numbers) and 
cautious (in terms of contents) personnel changes in the last two 
years. A few scholars34，J have so far studied Gorbachev's cadres policy 
in the context of his new initiatives and policies. It is certainly 
difficult to dissociate new people from new policies. However， this 
kind of study， inmy view， cannot predict the likely success or failure 
of Gorbachev's authority building strategy. The mediating factor 1 
tentatively explore in this paper might 10t provide the immediate 
answer to this question， but equally one cannot avoid examining it 
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if one is seeking to predict the likely outcome of the Gorbachev's 
strategy. 
There appears to be three major mediating factors operating in 
this connection， namely (1) common understanding， (2) coali tion -bui-
lding process， and (3) informal groups. 
The current members of the Politburo may have common unders-
tanding and perception as to the problems the Soviet Union currently 
faces and their possible solutions. They are better educated and more 
sophisticated in their ambitions for a society that has yet to demon-
strate that it is a superpower in more than merely military terms. 
Nevertheless， they appear to be disciplinarians who do not want to 
reform Marxism-Leninism， but simply make it more adaptable in the 
interests of巴conomicand administrative efficiency. A more adaptable 
ideology， they believe， wi1l promote a positive attitude towards the 
Soviet Union from its own people and foreigners alike. 
Generally speaking， it can be said that the longer a General 
Secretary is in power the more his old friends and associates are 
appointed to positions in the leadership and the top echelons of the 
various bureaucracies. Appointments based on clientelist links both 
reflect and reinforce the mounting powe1' of the General Sec1'etary. 
However， in the early stages of his tenu1'e they are not the main 
informal source of his powe1'. No incoming General Secretary has had 
more than one 01' two old associates with him in the Politburo in the 
first year of his incumbency. It is impo1'tant for him to get his own 
men into key personnel management posts， and Gorbachev achieved 
this when he appointed Razumovsky and Lukyanov to these positions. 
It is also important to have his trusted “allies" in cha1'ge of particu-
larly important policy interest-for example Shevardnadze and Mura-
khovsky. But the power and authority of the General Secretary at 
this stage will depend prima1'ily on a coalition with other membe1's of 
the Politburo， the understandings he 1'eaches with them regarding the 
way powe1' is to be exercised and on the broad lines of policy， and 
his effectiveness in developing a leadership style within the Politburo 
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itself， as much as within the broader political elite and the country 
as a whole. The combination of the General Secretary's formal powers 
and the informal power flowing from his personal leadership style 
may produce a bandwagon effect. If the coalition favours rapid 
turnover， as it does under Gorbachev but did not under Brezhnev， the 
bandwagon will roll even faster. In the process of coalition building， 
the General Secretary's committed old friends are joined by more and 
more committed new friends. Under al previous General Secretaries， 
the new friends have been as essential a part of the General Secreta-
ry's informal power base as the old friends. 
The factor I have especially in mind， leaving other equally impo-
rtant factors such as those listed above aside， isthe effect of informal 
group behaviour either directly or indirectly on policy process. The 
characteristic features of personnel changes do have an influence on 
the formation of formal and informal groupings and on their behavi-
oural patterns， changing their political interests， commitments， atti-
tudes and alliances. The existence of informal groupings (mediating 
units) themselves however does not make them interact with one 
another unless they have common cause with one another. The 
domestic policy agendas listed above may act as a catalytic agent 
among these mediating units. 
What 1 mean by an informal group here is a group that operates 
within the system， rather than an anti-government group. The 
formation of any political group has been regarded as running counter 
to ideological interests since the 10th Party Congress in 1921. Thus， 
any group that pursues its own interest can be said to be informal. 
VI. Informal Groups and their Characteristic Features 
In recent years， a Soviet scholar， A. V. Obolonsky has warned of 
the underestimation of the informal aspects of state administration. 
He justifies his statement by viewing the state administration as an 
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organic combination of formal and informal groups， principles， and 
modes of behaviour in various combinations and correlations. He then 
explains six factors underlying the formation of groups.35) These are 
(1) common background: graduated from the same school， worked 
together at a former place of work， came from the same home town， 
similar official career， (2) similar job “philosophyぺthatis， a system 
of views regarding the objectives， tasks， content， and forms of work 
activity， work style， and methods (in terms of various structural 
levels and oneself personally)， (3) the coincidence of individual with 
official interests (for example， people who have worked together in 
setting up a special information or other kind of service， people who 
are upgrading their qualifications together)， (4) similarity of psycho-
logical type， of character， etc.， (5) common off-the-job interests: 
shared preference for certain leisure pursuits， etc.， (6) deviant goals 
and behaviour whose members abuse their official position for selfish 
ends. Although Obolonsky does not differentiate political informal 
groups from social informal groups， and he speaks only of informaI 
groups within the state administration， he may be the first， in this 
writer's view， Soviet scholar who drew attention overtly to this 
question. 
1 have divided these groups into three categories， namely， clientelist 
groups， sectional groups and specialistjopinion groups. Most， ifnot 
al students of Soviet politics who have carried out studies of some 
aspects of informaI groups， have tended to use the three categories 
indiscriminately. True， these groups are categorised， at this stage， 
rather arbitrarily and are not exclusive of each other， but they are 
means of fostering a conceptuaI framework so that the effect of 
informaI groups in policy process can be observed. More sophisticated 
classifications of these groups is stilI to come after more extensive 
empirical findings are available. 
Clientelist GrouρA patron-client relationship is， according to 
CarI H. Lande's definition， a“vertical dyadic alliance"， an alliance 
between two persons of unequal status， power or resources each of 
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whom finds it useful to have as an ally someone superior or inferior 
to himself. Although it is difficult to pinpoint the exact reasons why 
two individuals form a patron-client relationship in the Soviet Union， 
it has been indicated by this writer and others elsewhere，36) that 
participants in the chain of clientelist relationships appear to treat 
political clientage as one of several possible alternatives to further 
career prospects and to acquire political power. However， my 
studies37) revealed that as long as certain elements such as the length 
of service required for advancement at each level and the timing of 
retirement from office remain less formalised， the clientage networks 
may not be able to express their functions fully in the area of the 
policy processes. Such a state of political clientage in the Soviet 
Union may indeed become an element of destabilization in the power 
structure of leadership， by offsetting its positive functions. 
Sectional GrouρSectionalism in the Soviet Union can be found 
in any vertically structured bodies such as the party machine， army， 
police and government organs. For example， an illustration can be 
made from the Cuban crisis in 1962. The final decision to put missiles 
in Cuba must have been made in the then Presidium (now Politburo). 
However， the path from the general decision to the actual appearance 
of operational missiles in Cuba involved a number of Soviet organi-
zations. As we know， the U. S. government easily spotted the cons-
truction sites of Soviet missiles in Cuba using one of its U-2 recon-
naissance planes. It was the GRU (Soviet military intelligence) that 
shipped， unloaded and transported missiles to construction sites. The 
KGB was also responsible for the exclusion of al Cubans from the 
ports and missile sites. Secrecy is their standard operating procedure. 
Once the weapons and equipment were delivered to the construction 
sites， Air Defense Command and the Strategic Rocket Forces were 
responsible for installing the various kinds of missiles. Missile sites 
under construction were not camouflaged in Cuba as there was no 
such practice in the Soviet Union. For a Soviet missile consruction 
crew， that would have been a hindrance to that organization's 
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objective: rapid completion of sites according to schedule.38) Each of 
the major ministries tends to control its own housing， research ins-
titutes， training institutions， construction departments， supply organs 
and so forth. These self-contained and compartmentalised government 
agencies proved also resistant to central direction.39) 
As can be seen in Table 12， the average length of service at 
federal level for the members of federal Council of Ministers (in 
1984) was about seventeen years. This wi1l certainly nurture loyalty 
and identity with their respective Ministries unless they are not 
rotated among the Ministries. For the last two years， we have 
observed a certain amount of government officials， but by and large 
this has occurred within similar groups of government bodies. None-
theless， the creation of a“superministry" like Gosagroprom may force 
the officials concerned to shift their political loyalty， attitudes and 
commitments slightly. In Table 12， one notices the lengthy service of 
the regional first secretaries at regional level. However， one would 
not expect them to pursue sectional interests. Using organizational 
terms and interpreting Soviet political system as a single bureaucratic 
body， we would call these party officials “lineぺwhereasthe members， 
if not al， of the Council of Ministers “staff". Thus， the upward and 
intra-organizational mobility of regional officials is higher. For 
instance， Table 7 shows clearly that the Central Committee secretaries 
have had career experience in other than party bodies whereas Presi-
dium members of the Council of Ministers have not. It should be 
noted that many of the clientelist bonds in the Soviet political system 
are largely formed during the patron's mid-career period， especially 
around regional and republican secretaries. There are of course party 
career specialists working in the bodies like the Central Committee 
departments. They might behave like those of the members of the 
Council of Ministers. 
SpecialisfjOρinion GrouρThis is a group of specialists engaged 
in research or study， and so able to express their opinion covertly or 
overtly. Thus， 1 do not mean here just specialists such as medical 
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doctors， engineers， agronomists， etc. who are working in a number 
of subordinate organizations. As the social and economic structure 
becomes diversified， and as technological evaluation continues to 
proceed， specialisation is an inevitable process. In this paper， the focus 
is on the following specialists: (1) specialists attached to research 
institutes; (2) specialists attached to executive and administrative 
bodies as consultants; (3) specialists attached to the individual Central 
Committee secretaries as advisers. 
The research institutes proliferated during the Khrushchev y巴ars，
ald under the Brezhnev leadership most institutes， ifnot al!， conducted 
studies relevant to policymaking.40) In the Soviet Union， there exists 
a variety of research institutes. Among them， the research institutes 
of the USSR Academy of Sciences are counted as the most influential 
in the policy process.叫 Selectedacademics in these institutes are 
given some measure of access to foreign literature and possibly 
diplomatic reports.叫 Becauseof the intricate relationships existing 
among high-powered bureaucrats in Moscow， an urgent study may on 
occasion be carried out at the request of a high official in the party 
or government who happens to be on close terms with an institute 
director or deputy director. Ad hoc committees to develop specific 
policy positions are convened increasillgly by the General Secretary's 
Secretariat.品) These committees include representatives of the 
relevant ministries and leading experts (usually directors or deputy 
directors) from the appropriate institutes of the Academy of Sciences， 
with the department concerned providing coordination and supervision 
of the deliberations. Although there exist research programs of the 
individual institutes that are approved by the appropriate divisions and 
sections and ultimately by the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences， 
individual institutes may originate such studies entirely on their own 
and then circulate them among the officials concerned in an attempt 
to advance a new approach to a critical problem or influence policy.44) 
These are a few examples of the way specialists influence the policy 
process. Difficulties in aggregating and articulating their interests 
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include the fact that not all specialists in each field have indentical 
opinions on the related questions. Their opinions may differ depending 
on their educational and career backgrounds and generations. Even in 
the same field， the analytical method and research orientation of 
individual research institutes are said to be different.45) 
One of the important factors that influence policy process is the 
degree of personal connection the specialists have with high party and 
government officials. For instance， academic administrators who began 
their careers in the Central Committee apparat or in the editorial 
offices of Pravda or lzvestia appear to have an advantage over their 
rivals.46) Public relations talents and ability to attract more prominent 
scholars and give good jobs to relatives of party and government 
officials also determine their relative standing. Specialists who live 
full-time in Moscow have naturally better chances of establishing ties 
with high officials.町 A connection of sorts between institutes and 
ministries is further maintained by the practice of having certain 
officials of scholarly background and disposition serve on the institutes' 
scientific councils， in which capacity they frequently take part in 
discussions and conferences. Another link is provided by a widespread 
urge among officials to work for advanced academic degrees， to attend 
scholarly conferences， and to write scholarly books and articles， which 
may become part of the scholarly debate. The practice of appointing 
scholars to high party and government positions creates additional 
ties between the academic world and the policy establishment. Powerful 
men may for complex personal and political reasons protect scholars 
with whom they disagree significantly; sometimes the officials may 
be relying on scholars for information， speech-writing， or even ideas; 
sometimes the officials and scholars are simply friends who talk over 
events and ideas together and could not sort out the constant shifting 
impact of their thinking upon each other.48) The impact of different 
specialists therefore depends on their ski1ls and personal authority in 
this intimate setting. 
There are number of specialists attached to the party and gove・
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rnment bodi.es. In the case of the Central Committee departments， 
they are cal1ed “a group of consultants".49) They are employed as 
either ful1-time or part-time staff， drawn from the scholar1y commi-
ttee. Although they have less opportunity to express their opinion in 
scholarly journals， they are said to be more inf1uential than specia-
lists attached to the research institutes.60) They participate in the 
formulation of major doctrinal statements and the writing of major 
speeches.61) Unlike the basic staff of the Central Committee depart-
ments， who have enough to do keeping up with the day-to-day develo・
pments in their areas， these consultants conduct in-depth research and 
carry out long-range studies.62) 
In the Brezhnev period， the status of the General Secretary's 
personal assistants appears to have been upgraded. Brezhnev's two 
major foreign policy assistants， A. M. Aleksandrov-Agentov and A. I. 
Blatov， worked for years in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before 
becomming his assistants. Thus， intheir case， their experience enabled 
them to concentrate on governmental relations.63) They served not 
only Brezhnev， but also the latter's successors， Andropov and Chern-
enko. Any Politburo member who seeks to form opinions of his own 
feels free to cal1 upon anybody for advice. Indeed， some of the 
Politburo members who occasionally supplement the knowledge they 
obtain through the official channels by informal personal advisers 
are probably viewed with suspicion by the experts in the Central 
Committee and the Ministries. In theory， each member of this body 
can raise any issue he wants-bypassing the Counci1 of Ministers and/ 
or Secretariat and having it discussed by the Politburo.54) 
The characteristic features of these three types of informal group 
are tentatively expressed in the form of a table (see Table 13). In the 
Table， these features have been clarified under three headings， namely， 
institutional setup， group behaviour， and policy. Both c1ientelist and 
sectional groups have a hierarchical structure with a group leader at 
its top. A clientelist group extends its membership across bureaucratic 
boundaries， whereas a sectional group consists of members of the 
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same or functionally related organization. An opinion group is not 
nec巴ssarilyformed in the same organization. The members sharing the 
same research field continue to associate with one another to pursue 
their interests as long as their research orientation is identical. It is 
however difficult to identify their group leader. As for the behavioural 
pattern， a c1ientelist group tends to behave particularistically in order 
to gain further power. A sectional group， while its members associate 
themselves with the substance of policy formulation and policy imple-
mentation， acts rather narrowly for the benefit of its organization. 
An opinion group with any speciality points out particular policy 
questions from a long-term standpoint， but within a doctrinal frame-
work. Their arguments are by and large rational and logical. A 
clientelist group attempts to link policy questions with power and 
create a situation advantageous to themselves as far as possible.町 A
sectional group tends to be passive towards administrative reforms， 
for they have vested interests in bureaucracy. Not al members of a 
clientelist group are directly involved in policy process but at least 
the group's leader and his c10se associates are involved in policy 
process indirectly， although some specialists are involved at times 
directly. The degree of inf1uence over the policy process by these 
three groups varies with the attributes of the policy concerned such 
as urgency， importance， dogmatic nature and whether it is domestic 
or foreign. The degree of influence may also vary， depending on the 
stages of policy formulation and implementation. 
Th巴 abovesummary of characteristic features indicate that the 
three informal groups are bound up one with another in the policy 
process. In another words， their relations are symbiotic. Particularly， 
the symbiotic relationship between a c1ient group and a sectional 
group and an opinion group are noticable. It is however a clientelist 
group that can make the most use of these tripartite symbiotic 
relations. 
(87) 
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Conclusion 
Viewing the present lineup of Politburo members from the 
viewpoint of clientelist connections， not only the two senior survivors 
of the Brezhnev group but also the other ful members do not belong 
to the Gorbachev group. It may be safe to assume that， judging from 
his career and age， he has not yet gained a strong and wide network 
of clientelist relations. Nonetheless， Gorbachev has succeeded in 
promoting his associates， ifnot at top level， and has also succeeded 
in widening the base of his support in the last two years.56) To a 
lesser extent， Ryzhkov and Ligachev were also able to promote their 
individual supporters (see Table 14).57) ]ohn H. Miller thinks that 
patronage has become less combative， pointing to the fact that 
considerable elements， first of collective patronage， and， second， of 
patronage vested in the General Secretary， represent an institutiona-
Iization of personnel policy-with the intent of depoliticising it， of 
taking it out of the domain of personal competition for power.田}
This appears to be true at the upper echelons of the political elite. 
Many of the Politburo members however were either there when 
Gorbachev was elected as General Secretary， or were coopted by 
collective leadership since Gorbachev came into power， and seem to 
have a similar pragmatic policy stance to Gorbachev. They may be 
currently highly motivated leaders sympathizing with Gorbachev's 
political posture and extending cooperation to him. There is a possi-
bility that this will grow into a more united group as the internal 
and external environment becomes severer. However， ifa situation in 
which each can fulfil his own desire arises， the group may be divided 
due to pursuance of individual interests and the negative side of 
“Government by Committee" would be restored. In that case， itwould 
be impossible to carry out personnel changes to the extent seen in 
the first and second year of the Gorbachev regime. 
Under the nomenklatura system， the party is not only used as an 
institution to mobilize competent persons but also as a centre of 
(88) 
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authority through which party leaders can exercise the right to appoint 
and dismiss their subordinate officials. Thus， party leaders at al 
levels make use of this privilege as a political means to reinforce 
their clientelist relations. Despite such informal activity persisting， 
Gorbachev appears to be making efforts to find hidden talent and 
revitalize the nation's policy implementation process and machinery by 
coopting these individuals. However， ithas been observed in the above 
study that the pool of able officials is really very narrow in the 
present Soviet political system and that there is a limit to its capacity 
to relocate the right cadre to the right post. 
The question is whether dominant clientelist groups like Gorba-
chev's have the will and the abilities to make the best use of the 
symbiotic relationship. It is generally believed that Brezhnev had 
established a strong and wide network of clientelist relations. Under 
his reign， a large number of specialists became associated with policy 
questions; and a few powerful government agencies pursued their 
sectional interests. Yet， Brezhnev's performance in both domestic and 
foreign policy areas was said to be poor. He fai!ed to make them 
interact to attain effective mobi!ization. Gorbachev， on the other 
hand， made his will clear in the policy agendas. These agendas are 
introduced with a view to affecting political， economic and social 
structures， procedures and policies. As these policy agendas appear to 
be， by recent Soviet standards， quite extensive， though contradictory， 
if some of these are to be realized for the realization of larger goals， 
then the active symbiotic relationships will necessari!y be called into 
play. Indeed， indrafting these policy agendas， Gorbachev must have 
already had assistance from some members of specialist-opinion 
groups， such as Fedor Burlatsky， Anatorii Butenko， Tatyana Zaslavskaya 
and Abel Aganbegyan.69) 
Another side effect of the realization of these domestic agendas 
is that there might occur certain modifications in the characteristic 
features of the informal groups. For instance，“revitalization and 
democratization" of the party through multipl巴 candidaciesand secret 
(89) 
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ballots at the local， and republican levels of the apparatus，60) together 
with the introduction of mandatory retirement age， not only help 
ensure a constant influx of fresh personnel into the middle and the 
upper echelons of the party， but also may make c1ientelist networks 
express their functions in the area of the policy process. The active 
interaction of symbiotic relations. and the likely course of 七回 intera-
ction depend by and large on the richness of the individual domestic 
agendas as well as its timely and effective realisation. 
Some may think of General Secretary Gorbachev as a charismatic 
leader building up dictatorial power. Or， some others may regard 
him as an unprecedentedly attractive and gifted leader whose unique 
personality gets his associated companions stepping al at the same 
pace. Many Politburo mem.bers are of the same generation as Gorba-
chev. At present， while Gorbachev is overseeing the overall activities 
of the party-state machinery he leaves party organization work and 
practical administrative management in the hands of Ligachev and 
Ryzhkov. Assuming that these two key lieutenants act as lubricant 
implicity and explicity using their experience and information fully， 
the Gorbachev leadership may act on the political and economic 
environment more positively. It should be noted， however， despite 
extensive personnel changes occurred under Gorbachev， that he and 
his agendas are resented by a substantial number of officials who 
owe their rise in the senior party ranks to the rate Brezhnev and 
Chernenko. There are stil1 influential generals in the conservative 
military who are rec1utant to follow the new order set by Gorbachev 
and may try to effect a change of leadership if support from the KGB 
came their way. If al his current domestic agendas fai!ed to bring 
positive results， Gorbachev might have recourse to coercive means. 
It is a feature of the Gorbachev leadership that it contains such a 
possibility， however remote it might appear. 
(90) 
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Table 1 Leadership Under Gorbachev (at 1 July 1987) 
Poesidium， CM PoIitburo Secretariat 
(14) Full member (14) (12) 
Gorbachev， M.' S. (21.10.80) 
Gorbachev， M. S. (11. 3， 85) Ryzhkov， N. 1. (29.9.85) 
Shcherbitsky， V. V; (9.-4.71) (General Sec.) (Chairman) 
(1st Sec. Ukr. CP. CC) 
AIiev， G. A. (22.11. 82) Ligachev， Ye. K. (16.3.85) 
(1st Dep. Chm.) Gromyko， A. A. (2焔.4.73) (Ideology) 
(Chm. Bureau of Social (Chm. Pr.es. Sup. Sov.) Zaikov， L.N. (1. 7..85) 
Developmenf) Aliev， G. A. (22.1工82) (De.fence. Industri~s) 
一一一-Polit. Full Memb.ー一一 Vorotnikov， V. 1. (26.12.83) Nikonov， V: P. .(23.4.85) 
! Talyzin， N. V. (14.10・85)
(Chm: RSFSR CM) (Agriculture) 
Solom'entsev， M. S. (26.12.83) Yakovlev， A. N. (6.3.86) . (1st Dep. Chm.) (Chm. Pty. Control C'ttee) (Head， Propaganda) 
1 (Chm. Gosplan) 1 
Chebrikov， V. M. (23:4.85) Slyun'kov， N. N. (29.1. 87) J、......Po!it. Cand. Memb. ...J (Chm: K. G. B.) (Head， Econ¥)my) 
Murakhovsky， V: S. (1. 1. 85) Ligachev， Ye. K. (23..4.85) ー-.Po!it. .Full Memb.ー一一一(1st Dept. Chm.) 
Ryzhkov， N:.1. (23.4..85) :;n"，Lーー一一一一一一...ーーーーーーーーーーー-------蜘-~-----(Chm. Gosagroprom) 
Shevardnadze， E. A. (1. 7. 85) !' Dolgikh，. V. 1. (18.12.72) 
Vedernikov， G. G. (19.6.86) 1: (Heavy lnd.. and Energy) (MiIl. Foreign Aff.) 
(responsibi1jty unknown) 
Zaikov，. L. N. (6.3.86) :;... Polit. Cand. Memb. . 
Anto.nov， A. K. ( .12.80) 
Slyun'kov， N. N. (26.6.87) Biryukova， A. P. (6.3.86) (Perm. Rep. Comecon) 
(Social Policies) 
Shcherbina， V. E. ( .1. 84) Yakovlev， AょN.(26.6..87) 
Dobrynin， A. F. (6.3.86) 
(Chm. Bureau of Fuel Nikonov， V.:P. (26..6.87) 
(Head， International) 
Energy Complex) 
Medvedev， V. A晶 (6.3.86)
Gusev， V. K. (19.6.86) Catldidte Member (6) 
(Head， Liaison with 
(responsib. unknown) Demichev， P.・N.(8.4.66) Communist & Workers' 
BataIin， Yu. P. (21.12.85) (1st Dep， Chm. Pres. Sup. Parties of Socia!ist 
(Chm. Gosstroi) Sov.) Countries) 
Voronin， L.A. (15.11.85) Dolgik.h， V. 1. (24.5.82) Razumovsky， G. P.. (6.3.86) 
(Chm. St. C'ttee for Talyzin， N. V. (15.10.85) (Head， Org. Pty Work) 
Material & Tech. Supply) (Chm. Gosplan) Luk'yanov， A. 1. (29.1. 87) 
Maslyukov， Yu. D. (16.11.85) Yel'tsiri， B.N. (28.2.86) (Head， General Affairs) 
(Chm. Mil..lnd. Commis，)， οst Sec.. Moscow gorkom) 
l¥:amentse.v， V， M. (1. 9.86) Solov'ev， Yu. .F. (6.3.86) 
(Chm. C'ttee of External (1st Sec. Leningrad obkom) 
Economy) 
Yazov， D. T. (26.6目87)
Silaev，. 1. S. (2: 1. 85) (Min. Defence) 
(Chm. Bureal， of Machine 
Bui1d.) 
Tolstykh， B. L. (7.2.:87) 
(Clim. St. C'ttee for Sc. 
& Tech.) 
Note: The numbers in brackets indicate the date of appointment. 
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Table 2 Politburo: Nationalities and Education 
Russian 
Ukrainian 
Belorussian 
Kazakh 
Georgian 
Azerbaidzhani 
Complete Higher 
General 
Industry 
Education 
History 
Law 
Mi1itary 
EconomicsjFinance 
Agriculture 
Incomplete Higher 
Total 
Comp1. also 
Higher Pty. Sch. 
Kandidat 
Doctorate 
51~55 
56~60 
61~65 
66~70 
Above 70 
Total 
Average 
(92) 
Full Candidate 
1984 1 1987ωy) 1984 11987 (刷
8 も.796 10 71. 5タ 5 83.3% 6 100.0~多
2 16.7 l 7.1 
1 7.1 1 16.7 
1 8.3 
l 7.1 
1 8.3 1 7.1 
1 12 100. 0 I 14 9. 9 I 6 100. 0 1 6 100. 0 
1 7.1% 
7 58.4~ぢ 6 42.9 
1 8.3 2 14.3 
1 8.3 
1 8.3 l 7.1 
1 8.3 1 7. 1 
3 21. 4 
1 8.3 
12 
Table 3 Politburo: Age 
Full 
1984 I 1987 (July) 
l 8.3:彰 96 
1 8.3 5 35.7 
2 16.7 5 35.7 
2 16.7 2 14.3 
6 50.0 2 14.3 
12 100. 0 [ 14 100.。
68 ys. 63 ys. 
4 96. 7~多
2 33.3 
5 83.396 
1 16.7 
1 16.7~多
1 16.7 
1 16.7 
Candidate 
1984 |即(July)
手話
2 33.3% 2 33.3 
1 16.7 3 50.0 
1 16.7 1 16.7 
2 33.3 
6 100.0 100.0 
68 ys. 62 ys. 
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Table 4 Politburo: Career Background 
Length of service 
(Pty and/or Govt) 
Current position 
Federal level 
Republic level 
Local level 
Int巴r.organization
circulation of career 
Pty plus Govt 
Pty plus other org. 
Govt+other org. 
Pty+Govt+other org. 
Total 
Inter.role circulation of 
career 
TLE+E+S 
TLE十E+O
TLE+E+O+S 
Total 
2 
2 
2 
6 
12 
Full 
1984 |附(July)
years years 
7.2 4.4 
12.3 10.3 
11. 9 4. 7 
9. 7 11.2 
16. 7~ち 2 14.3~多
16.7 1 7.1 
16.7 2 14.3 
50.0 9 64.3 
1 
2 
1 
2 
Candidate 
1984 
years 
11. 3 
23.3 
3.5 
5.1 
16.7% 
33.3 
16.7 
33.3 
11987 (July) 
years 
5.0 
10.8 
1.8 
10.3 
1 16.796 
2 33.3 
1 16.7 
2 33.3 
6 100.。
66.6% 
1 16.7 
1 16.7 
100.0 
Notes: TLE (top.line executive); E (executive); S (specialist); 0 (operative) 
“Top.line executiveヘmeansthe top executive and administrative positions 
in particular bodies in different levels， e.g. first secretary of Party committee， 
chairman of the Council of Ministers or executive committee， chairman of 
social organization， chairman of industrial or agricultural ent巴rpriseand 
director of any other organization. The areas of responsibility varies thus 
widely from obkom first secretary to kolkhoz chairman. Despite vast 
difference in the degrees and kinds of responsibility among themselves， the 
top.line executives at different levels and in different organizations should 
al have basic managerial skill and organizational competency.“Executive"， 
means middle.level managerial positions in any organization.“Specialist"， 
means technically qualified people such as engineer， economist， lawyer， 
medical doctor， pedagogue， mathematician， etc. Also， journalist， and artistic 
and literary people; e. g.: writer， poet， painter， film director， designer， etc. 
are included as specialists.“Operative"， means largely a rank and file worker 
in any organization， which includes unskilled worker and also skilled opera. 
tive such as driver， school teacher， typist， policeman， clerk， professional 
soldier， etc. 
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Tab!e 5 Secretariat and Presidium of the Counci! of 
Ministers: Nationalities and Education 
Presidium， CM 
1984 1即(Ju切 1984 11987ωy) 
Russian 9 90.0Jo 11 91. 7タ 9 56.3% 11 78.6% 
Ukrainian 2 12.5 2 14.3 
Be!orussian 1 10.0 1 8.3 
Azerbaidzhani l 6.2 1 7.1 
Mo!davian 1 6.2 
Armenian 1 6.2 
Minorities (other than 15 
republican nationalities) 2 12.5 
I_!~_~OO.O 1 12 100.0 1 16 99.9 1 14 100.0 
Complete Higher 
Genera! l 6.2~診 l 7.1% 
Industry 6 60.0% 5 41. 5:与 11 68.9 11 78.6 
Agricu!ture 1 10.0 4 33.3 
History 1 10.0 1 8.3 l 6.2 
Education 2 20.0 1 7.1 
Sc. Techno!ogy 1 6.2 
Economics/Finance l 8.3 2 12.5 1 7.1 
Law l 8.3 
Tota! 10 100.0 1 12 100.0 1 16 10ιo 114 99.9 
Comp!ete also 
Higher Pty. Sch. 3 1 2 1 7.0勿
Kandidat l 10.0 1 8.3 2 12.5 1 7.1 
Doctorate 3 25.0 6 37.5 2 14.3 
(94) 
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Table 6 5ecretariat and Presidium， CM; Age 
5ecretariat Presidium， CM 
1984 11987 (July) 1984 11987 (July) 
46~50 2 14.3タρ
51~55 2 20.0名 l 8.3必 2 12.5;?o 1 7.1 
56~60 1 10.0 5 41. 7 2 12.5 7 50.0 
61~65 2 20.0 3 25.0 1 6.2 2 14.3 
66~70 2 20.0 2 16.7 4 25.0 1 7.1 
Above 71 3 30.0 1 8.3 7 43.8 1 7.1 
Total |10 100司12100o 1 16 100.0 1 14 100.0 
Average 1 66 ys 1 61 ys 1 70 ys 1 59 ys 
Table 7 5ecretariat and Presidium， CM; Career Background 
5ecretariat Presidium， CM 
1984 11987 (July) 1984 
1
1駅同
Length of 5ervice 
(Pty andjor Govt) 
Current position 8.6 ys 2.6 ys 7.9 ys 2.8 ys 
Federal level 19. 7 16.0 24.0 12.3 
Republic level 3.4 0.5 3.8 1.9 
Local level 13.1 10.1 5.5 5.7 
Inter.organizational 
circulation of career 
Org. other than Pty 
and Govt 1 6.2勿
Pty plus Govt 1 10.0忽 1 6.2 2 14.3% 
Pty+other org. 3 30.0 4 33.3勿 2 14.3 
Govt+other org. 2 16.7 11 68.8 7 50.0 
Pty+Govt+other org. 6 60.0 6 50.0 3 18.8 3 21. 4 
|ω100.0 1 12 100.0 1 16 100.0 1 14 100.0 
Inter.role circulation of 
career 
5+0 1 8.3勿
TLE+E十S 5 50.0忽 6 50.0 15 93.8勿 7 50.{)~ち
TLE+E+O 3 30.0 3 25.0 2 14.3 
TLE+E+0+5 2 20.0 2 16.7 1 6.2 5 35.7 
Total 1 10 1而TJ.210.0 1.6-100.0 1 14 100. 0 
Notes; TLE (top-line executive); E (executive); 5 (specialist); 0 (operative) 
(95) 
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Table 8 Regional First Secretaries in RSFSR: Personnel Changes 
(March 1985-J uly 1 1987) 
Position after 
removal 
1 
3 
1 
3 
??????
15 (41. 696) 
1 
1 
CPSU， CC， Sec. 
CPSU， CC， Head 
CPSU， CC， Dep. Head 
CPSU， CC， Inspcetor 
1st Sec. Repub. CP 
1st Sec. Obkom. 
2nd Sec. Obkom. 
Federal CM， Dep. Chm. 
Repub. CM， Dep. Chm. 
Federal CM， Min. 
Federal CM， 1st Dep. Min. 
Ambassador 
Chm. Oblispolkom. 
1st Dep. Chm. Oblispolkom. 
Pensioner 
Death 
Unknown 
Previous position 
of new member 
1 
1 
4 
13 (36. 1~ち)
4 
5 
2 
1 
3 
1 
36 36 Total 
Table 8-1 Inspectors: Their Previous Regional Position 
l Sam巴日gion [Other region Total 
???
??
???
?
??
??
??
5 
1 
1st Sec. Obkom. 
2nd or Sec.Obkom. 
1st Sec. Gorkom. 
2nd or Sec. Gorkom. 
13 
Table 8-2 Those Other Than Inspectors: Their Previous Regional Position 
Same region [0山河川
7 6 Total 
Total 
Direct Indirect 
1st Sec. Obkom. 3 3 
2nd or Sec. Obkom. 4 3 1 8 
1st Sec. Gorkom. 1 1 
Chm. Oblispolkom. 3 3 
1st Dep. Chm. Oblispolkom. 1 1 
Sub-total 8 4 
16 
(96) 
4 12 Total 
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Table 9 Members of Federal CM: Personnel Changes 
(March 11 1985-J uly 1， 1987) 
Previous position 
of new member Position after removal 
Pres. Sup. Sov.， Chm. 
Pres. Sut. Sov.， 1st Dep. Chm. 
4 Federal CM， Dep. Chm. 
11 Federal CM， Ministerial position 
13 Federal CM， 1st Dep. Ministerial position 
5 Federal CM， Dep. Ministerial position 
3 Ambassador 
l Repub. CM， Ministerial position 
l CPSU， CC， Head 
4 CPSU， CC， 1st Dep. Head 
1 CPSU， CC， Inspector 
1 CPSU， CC， Section Head 
1 Repub. Pty CC， 1st. Sec. 
1 Repub. Pty CC， Sec. 
4 1st Sec. Obkom. 
2 2nd Sec. Gorkom./Aut. Repub. 
1 Sec.， TUC 
Pres. USSR Academy of Sciences 
10 Enterprise/lnstitute/Other bodies， Head 
Pensioner 
Death 
Unknown 
(Newly created position 
Total 63 
?
?
??
1 
2 
1 
3 
35(55.5%) 
4 
2 
10) 
63 
(97) 
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Table 10 Changes in the Counci1 of Ministers Under Gorbachev 
Ministry since renamed: (at Jyly 1， 1987) 
t ・Ministryfor Construction in the Far East arid Transbaika1 Area renamed 
Miriistry for Construction in. the Eastern' Region of-thc Sovict 1Jnion. (19.8.86) 
Agencies since restructured: 
• .Ministry for Medical lndustry cha'nged to Ministry for Medical and Biological 
lndustry (22.11. 85) 
• Ministry for Agricultural. Procureme!lt changed to Miriistry for Grain Products 
(2. 11. 85) 
• State Committee for Construction Affairs changed to State Committee for 
Construction (17.8.86) 
State Committee since upgraded， entitling its Chairman to Council of Ministers 
membership: 
• State Coinmittee for Physical Culture and Sports (11. 4. 86) 
New Agencies: 
• Commission for Improving Administration， Planning and the Economic 
Mechanism ( .1.86) 
. Minis，ry for Atomic Power Generation (12.7.86) 
• State Committee for Computer and lnformation and lnformation Science (22.386) 
・Ministryfor Construction in the Northern and Western Region of the Soviet 
Union (19.8.86) 
. Ministry for Construction in the Southcrn Region of the Soviet Union (19.8.86) 
・Minislryfor Construction in the Ural and Western Siberia Region of the Soviet 
Union (19.8.86) 
「一一一ー・ StateAgro.lndustrial Committee (22.11.85) 
1 ・Bureauof the USSR Council of Ministers for Machine Building (14.10.85) 
|・ Bureauof the USSR Council of Ministers fo'r Social Devclopment (10.11.86) 
|・ Bureauof the USSR .Council of Ministers for Fuel Energy Complex (10.3.86) 
|・ Committeeof the USSR Council of Ministers for External Economy (10.11. 86) γ ion entitled … 一t山e悶 s…me1時lmbers悶 ぬ帥hi均泊p
. FirsはtDeput勾yア Cha討ir口merロ1(α2)。ぱfthe State Agr叩oか司lndusはtr吋ia叫1Committee (σ29.11.85 
and 16.12.85) 
• First Deputy Chairman of Gosplan (4.12.85) 
• First Deputy Chairman of State Committee for Conslruction (25.8.86) 
Agencies since abolished: 
戸Ministryfor Construction (19.8.86) 
モ--1.Ministry for Industrial Conslruction (19.8.86) 
しMinistryfor Construction of IIeavy Industry Enterprises (19.8.86) 
(0 Ministry .for Meat and Dairy.Products lndustry (22.11. 85) 
卜Ministryfor Food Industry (22.11. 95) 
トMinistryfor Fruit and. Vegetables (22.11.85) 
〈ー十 Ministryfor Rural Construction (22.11. 85) 
(98) 
卜Ministryfor Agriculture (22.11. 85) 
l: State Committee for Production and Technological Supply of' Agriculture 
(22.11.85) 
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
? ?
?
?
?
? ? ? ?
?
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Table 12 Regional First Secretaries (RSFSR) and Members of 
Federal CM: Length of Services (as of 1984) 
I 1stSec. Reg町 IMem. Fed. CM 
No. % No. 手伝
Current position: 
Below 5 years 22 30.6 40 47.1 
6~15 33 45.8 24 28.2 
16~25 13 18.0 16 18.8 
Above 26 years 3 4.2 3 3.5 
Unknown 1 1.4 2 2.4 
Totaj 72 100.。85 100.0 
Average length 10.1 years 8.7 years 
Federal level: 
Below 5 years 12 16.7 10 11. 8 
6~15 31 36.5 
16~25 25 29.4 
26~35 12 14.1 
Above 36 years 5 5.9 
None 59 81. 9 
Unknown l 1.4 2 2.3 
Total 72 100.。85 100.0 
Average length 1. 3 years 17.1 years 
Republic level: 
Below 5 years 1 1.4 8 9.4 
6~15 1 1.4 8 9.4 
None 69 95.8 67 78.9 
Unknown 1 1.4 2 2.3 
Total 72 100.。85 100.。
Average length 1.1 year 1.1 year 
Regional level (inc1ude krai， 
oblast， City， raion) : 
Below 5 years 1 1.4 21 24.7 
6~15 12 16.7 14 16.5 
16~25 31 43.0 10 11. 7 
26~35 20 27.8 1 1.2 
Above 36 years 7 9. 7 
None 37 43.6 
Unknown 1 1.4 2 2.3 
Total 72 100.0 85 100.0 
A verage length 23.7 years 5.0 years 
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Table 14 Personal Connections (as of July 1， 1987) 
Gorbachev 
V. 1. Nikonov Secretary， CC 
G. P. Razumovsky Secretary， CC 
V. S. Murakhovsky 1st Dep. Chm. CM; Chm. Gosagroprom， USSR 
A. V. Vlasov Minister of Internal Affairs， USSR 
V. G. Afonin Head， Dept of Chemical Industry， CC 
N. Ye. Kruchina Head， Dept of Administration of Affairs， CC 
A. 1. Luk'yanov Head， General Dept， CC; Sec. CC 
M. V. Gramov Chm. St. C'tee Sports & Physical Culture， USSR 
A. 1. Iyevlev 1st Dep. Chm. Gosagroprom， USSR 
V. A. Kaznacheyev Chm. St. C'tee. Vocational & Tech. Education， RSFSR 
V. 1. Kaeashnikov 1st Sec. Volgograd Obkom 
B. M. Volodin 1st Sec. Rostov Obkom 
A. A. Khomyakov 1st Sec. Saratov Obkom 
V. V. Chikin Editor，‘Sovetskaya Rossiya' 
1. T. Frolov Editor，‘Kommunist' 
L. N. Spiridonov 1st Dep. Editor，‘Pravda' 
A. A. Nikonov Head， Agricultural Institute 
G. A. Romanenko Head， Agricultural Instiiute 
Ryzhkov 
B. N. Yel'tsin 1st Sec. Moscow Gorkom 
N. N. Slyun'kov S巴c.(Economy)， CC 
G. V. Kolbin 1st Sec. Kaz. CP 
L. F. Bobykin Head， Light Industry & Consumer Goods， CC 
Yu. D. Maslyukov Dep. Chm. CM， USSR 
L. A. Voronin 1st Dep. Chm. Gosplan， USSR 
E. A. Varnachev Gen. Dir. Prod. Assoc.‘Uralmash' 
Yu. V. Petrov 1st S巴c.Sverdlovsk Obkom 
Ya. P. Ryabov Ambassador to France 
Ligachev 
A. G. Mel'nikov Head， Construction， CC 
P. Ya. Slezko 1st Dep， Head， Propaganda， CC 
N. S. Yermakov 1st Sec. Kemerovo Obkom 
Yu. 1. Litvintsev 1st Sec. Tula Obkom 
G. V. Aleshin 2nd Sec. Est. CP 
F. 1. Loshchenkov Chm. St. C'tee. Material Reserve， USSR 
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Organization of lndustrial Production of the Siberian Department of 
the USSR Academy of Sciences)， some of their proposals have been 
put into effect as we have noted earlier on the creation of“supermi-
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continues however to edit EKO， the monthly journal of the Novosibirsk 
institute. See Radio Liberty Research， RL308/85， September 15， 1985. 
60) This is the proposal Gorbachev made at the January 27，1987 plenum. A 
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